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ABSTRACT

Key technological advances in wireless communications, Micro Electro Mechanical Systems (MEMS), and digital circuitry
have energized the research community to focus on the challenges of wireless sensor networks. In this paper, we propose a
new pre-distribution key management scheme that meets the operational and security requirements of wireless sensor
networks and provide authentication and key distribution in one set of protocols. Our scheme allows selective key revocation
and node re-keying and posits improved network resiliency over existing key pre-distribution schemes. The scheme is based
on probability key sharing among sensor nodes of a random graph and incorporates a threshold property. Uncompromised
nodes in a sensor network are secure provided that an adversary compromises less than a threshold-number of nodes. We
describe the details of our algorithm and briefly compare it with other proposed schemes.
Keywords

Security algorithms, wireless sensor networks, pre-distribution key management
INTRODUCTION

Wireless sensor networks have emerged as an innovative class of networked embedded systems due to the union of ever
smaller, less costly embedded processors and wireless interfaces with micro-sensors based on micro-mechanical systems
(MEMS) technology (Peters, Smith, Medeiros, and Rohrer, 2001). Wireless sensor networks are composed of small
autonomous devices, or sensor nodes, that are networked together. Each node is equipped with one or more sensors, storage
and processing resources, and communication and instrumentation subsystems. The sensors observe phenomena; each sensor
is specialized to monitor a specific environmental parameter such as thermal, optic, acoustic, seismic, or acceleration
(Meguerdichian, Koushanfar, Potkonjak, and Srivastava, 2001). Sensor nodes typically perform their tasks unattended, often
in remote locations. They may be deployed either inside, or nearby, target phenomenon to be studied.
Typical sensor networks will support a variety of military, medical, environmental, and commercial applications. Remote
sensors could reduce confusion within combat zones by collecting information about battlefield conditions. Sensor networks
are currently being used for condition-based maintenance of complex equipment in factories. Natural environments (i.e.,
remote ecosystems, endangered species, disaster
Task Manager
sites, forest fires.) can be monitored with sensor
Node (User)
networks (Kahn, Katz and Pitzer, 1999; Park,
Savvides, and Srivastava, 2001).
Sensor networks often contain one or more sinks
that provide centralized control. A sink typically
serves as the access point for the user or as a
gateway to another network (Akyildiz, Su,
Sankarasubramaniam, and Cayirci, 2003). Large
sensor networks can be composed of thousands of
sensor nodes deployed in the field to jointly
observe a region. Figure 1 depicts a typical
sensor network. Compromise of any node,
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Figure 1 – Sensor Network Architecture
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particularly the sink, is a sensor network security concern, but outside the scope of this paper.
Sensor networks have several major constraints awaiting research resolution: limited processing power, limited storage
capacity, limited bandwidth, and limited energy. Researchers are working to solve many of the limitations affecting sensor
nodes and networks. Some researchers are working to improve node design; others are developing improved protocols
associated with a sensor network; still others are working to resolve security issues. The focus of our research involves
secure key distribution schemes within wireless sensor networks.
KEY DISTRIBUTION SCHEMES IN SENSOR NETWORKS

Sensor networks are typically wireless deployments, sometimes in hostile environments, and are subjected to greater security
risks. Establishing secure communications involving the setup and distribution of secret keys is an open problem for sensor
network researchers. Currently, there are three general key agreement schemes: trusted-server or arbitrated protocol, selfenforcing, and key pre-distribution scheme (Du, Ding, Han, and Varshney, 2003). The trusted-server scheme requires a
trusted server to establish shared-session keys between nodes and is prone to directed attacks against this central point of
weakness. Another key agreement scheme is the self-enforcing scheme, which depends upon asymmetric protocols and
algorithms. However, with the low memory and energy constraints of sensor nodes, public-key algorithms common in
asymmetric cryptography limits the practical use of this key distribution scheme. Presently, the only practical scheme for key
distribution in large sensor networks is key pre-distribution, where key information is installed in each sensor node prior to
deployment. Typically, two solutions have been used: 1) a single mission key where all nodes carry a master secret key or 2)
a set of separate n – 1 keys, each being a pairwise set that is privately shared with another sensor node (Eschenauer and
Gilgor, 2002; Du, Fang, Wang, and Chen, 2003). Both are inadequate for use in sensor networks since conciliation of the
single mission key may compromise the entire network and storage of n – 1 keys in each sensor node or n(n – 1)/2 per sensor
network bounds practical adoption. To overcome the challenges and limitations associated with both schemes, several other
key management schemes have been proposed.
Eschenauer and Gilgor’s Random Key Pre-Distribution Scheme

Eschenauer and Gilgor (Eschenauer and Gilgor, 2002) proposed a random key pre-distribution scheme based on probabilistic
key sharing and utilization of a simple shared-key discovery protocol for key distribution, key revocation, and node rekeying. Prior to a sensor network deployment, each sensor node receives a key ring with a randomly chosen subset of keys
from a large key pool. Upon deployment and network initialization, sensor nodes will be able to establish a secure and direct
communication link provided that a shared key exists between one or more pairs of sensor nodes. Due to the random
distribution of keys to each sensor node, it is probable that a shared key may not be available, necessitating an intermediary
node with a common key between the two sensor nodes to establish a common session key. Eschenauer and Gilgor found
that to establish “almost certain shared-key connectivity for a 10,000-node network, a key ring of only 250 keys randomly
selected from a 100,000 pool has to be pre-distributed to every sensor node.”
Eschenauer and Gilgor’s key distribution scheme consists of three phases: key pre-distribution, shared key-discovery, and
path-key establishment. The key pre-distribution phase occurs prior to sensor node deployment. During this phase, a large
pool of P random keys (e.g., 217 – 2 20 keys) and their key identifiers are generated. Each sensor node receives a subset of
randomly chosen k keys and their associated key identifiers plus a shared key with a trusted controller node that stores all
keys and associated identifiers for every network node. The shared key between the controller node and each sensor node is
unique and is infrequently used to support key revocation. The purpose of the key pre-distribution phase is to ensure that a
small number of keys are available to probabilistically establish a common key between two or more sensor nodes during the
shared-key discovery phase.
The shared-key discovery phase occurs post-hoc of the sensor network deployment during an initialization period where each
sensor node attempts to discover its neighbors with which its shares a common key(s). This can be done by the broadcast of
each sensor nodes key identifier list in plaintext or a list α, EKi (α), i = 1, … , k, where α is a challenge. Decryption with a
proper key of EKi (α) would meet the challenge and establish a shared key with the broadcasting node. It is possible that
more than one pair of sensor nodes may share the same key since all keys are randomly chosen from a larger pool set.
The path-key establishment phase is used to assign a path-key to selected sensor-node pairs within a defined communication
range that do not share a common key but are connected by two or more links created during the shared-key discovery phase.
An intermediary node generates the path-key with a shared key between two or more unconnected link nodes. Path-keys do
not have to be generated by the intermediary, as a number of keys are available on its key ring after the shared-key discovery
phase is finished.
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Blom’s Symmetric Key Generation Scheme

Du et al. (2003) proposed a pre-distribution scheme that adapted ideas from Blom’s symmetric key generation system (Blom,
1985) and Eschenauer and Gilgor’s algorithm previously discussed. According to Blom, any pair of nodes can calculate a
secret pairwise key between them using distinct data elements stored in λ + 1 memory spaces in each node. Blom posited
that “as long as no more than λ nodes are compromised, the network is perfectly secure (referred to as the λ-secure
property).” Increasing λ leads to greater network resiliency but also leads to higher memory utilization within each sensor
node. To calculate a secret pairwise key, each sensor node uses a data set derived from several linear algebra operations.
1.

2.

During the pre-deployment phase, a (λ + 1) x N matrix G over a
finite field GF(q), where q is an element within the finite field, N
is the number of sensor nodes in the network and λ is the
security parameter previously discussed, is constructed. To meet
the λ-secure property, G must be linearly independent. It has
been shown that a Vandermonde matrix is linearly independent
when its elements s, s2, s3, … , sN are all distinct (MacWilliams
and Sloane, 1977). A feasible (λ + 1) x N matrix G over a finite
field GF(q) can be constructed based on this type of matrix (Du
et al, 2003; MacWilliams and Sloane, 1977) depicted in
Equation 1. Each nonzero element of GF(q) can be represented
by some power of si for some 0 < i ≤ q –1, where q is chosen to
be the smallest prime number larger than 2key size.
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Equation 1

During pre-deployment, a random (λ + 1) x (λ + 1) symmetric matrix D over GF(q) is computed and used to
compute an N x (λ + 1) matrix A, which is equal to A = (D ⋅ G ) . Matrix D is private information and must be
T

kept secret. Matrix A is the transpose of

(D ⋅ G )T .

(D ⋅ G ) .

Therefore, the kth column of (D ⋅ G ) becomes the kth row of

3.

During pre-deployment, the kth row of matrix A and the kth column from matrix G is stored at sensor node k, where k
= 1, … , N. In practice, sk is a primitive or seed element of GF(q) that can be used to calculate the associated
column values of matrix G. Therefore, only sk needs to be stored at sensor node k.

4.

After sensor node deployment, two nodes i and j can find the pairwise key between them by exchanging their

columns of G and using their private rows of matrix A to calculate kij = kji = Ai⋅Gj = Aj⋅Gi = ( A⋅ G ) . This is
possible since A⋅G is a symmetric matrix. Figure 2 illustrates how secret pairwise keys are generated.
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Figure 2

Multiple-Space Key Pre-distribution Scheme

Under Du et al. multiple key spaces generated from Blom’s λ-secure symmetric key generation system are randomly
assigned to each sensor node in a network. This is similar to Eschenauer and Gligor’s assignment of randomly generated
keys from a large key pool. Two nodes are able to calculate a unique pairwise key if and only if both nodes share a common
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key space. During the pre-deployment phase, a generator matrix G of size (λ + 1) x N is created and followed by the creation
T

of ω symmetric matrices D1, …, Dω of size (λ + 1) x (λ + 1) and matrices Ai = ( Di ⋅ G ) , where indices i = 1, … , ω, are
generated. Each tuple of Ai is defined as a key space. From Ai, a randomly selected number of 1 < τ ≤ ω distinct key spaces
are selected and assigned to each sensor node. After deployment, each node will attempt to identify its common-space
neighbors by broadcasting a message that contains its unique node ID, the indices of the key spaces it carries, and the
assigned column data set or seed value from G. If nodes i and j are neighbors with a common space (e.g., Sc, with node i
assigned Ac(i) and seed for G(i) and node j has Ac(j) and the seed for G(j)), a secret pairwise key can be calculated by each
node independently by kij = kji = Ac(i)⋅G(j) = Ac(j)⋅G(i).
OUR PROPOSED KEY PRE-DISTRIBUTION SCHEME

We propose a new key pre-distribution scheme that builds from Blom’s and Eschenauer and Gilgor’s key distribution
schemes and is supported by points based on key splitting, authentication and key exchange from the Yahalom protocol
(Schneir, 1996). Our scheme leverages Eschenauer and Gilgor’s reliance on probabilistic key sharing between nodes that
have been assigned a randomly selected subset of keys from a larger key pool but, unlike Eschenauer and Gilgor’s scheme of
storing k, 64-bit keys, we store 32-bit keys in each node and concatenate an additional 32-bit random key for links that are
able to establish a secure communication link. A unique 64-bit pairwise key that contains the shared key-half between nodes
and a second key-half generated after deployment and during a shared-key discovery phase supports each secure link. The
second key-half is randomly generated by one of the node-pairs and distributed with support from Blom’s key calculation
scheme. Following is the detail of our key pre-distribution proposal in relationship to the three basic phases previously
discussed: key pre-distribution phase, shared-key identification phase, and path-key establishment phase. The path-key
establishment phase will not be discussed as it assumes the same protocol proposed by Eschenauer and Gilgor.
1.

Generation of Large Key Pool. A large pool of random 32-bit keys denoted by P and associated identifiers are
generated. The size of the pool is sufficiently large (e.g., 100 – 1,000 times the deployed network size) to ensure
non-probability key attacks are minimized. Each key will be identified by an integer value 1 to the number of keys
generated.

2.

Generation of Blom’s System Matrices. A primitive element, s, is selected from a finite field GF(q) such that the
element is the smallest prime number larger than 232. This element represents the seed element of the general
Vandermonde matrix G shown in Equation 1. The size of the matrix will equal the number of P keys generated in
step 1 and an λ equal to a security threshold level appropriate for the network (e.g., λ ≥ 250). Once a seed value has
been selected, a random (λ + 1) x (λ + 1) symmetric matrix D is generated and used to compute an N x (λ + 1)
matrix A = (D⋅G)T. All elements in each matrix are considered
non-public information and must be kept secret.
32 bits
32 bits
Node Assignments. For each sensor node, k randomly selected
Primary Key
Randomly generated
keys and associated identifiers are assigned. These keys represent
key y1
Ax1, Idx1, key (x1)
one-half of the pairwise keys that will be generated between two
Randomly generated
Idx2, key (x2)
nodes. Each node will be assigned one row from matrix A
key y2
corresponding to one key and associated key identifier generated
in step 1. This row-key pair will be used as a primary identifier
.
.
for each sensor node. Lastly, the primitive element selected in
.
.
step 2 will be stored in each sensor node’s memory. This element
will be used to calculate the corresponding column of matrix G
.
.
for each key identifier selected. A general memory map for each
Randomly generated
Idxk, key (xk)
sensor node is shown in Figure 3, where Ax is the row assignment
key yK
from matrix A and IDx, and key (x) are k randomly selected keys
and associated integer identifiers over 1 < x < k.
Figure 3

3.

Shared-Key Identification Phase

After sensor network deployment , each node needs to establish a secure communication link with each neighbor who share a
common key and are within wireless communication range. This is started with each node broadcasting a message
containing their primary key identifier and a randomly generated nonce value Nx. Assuming that nodes i and j are neighbors,
and have received the broadcast, they will check their memory map for a common key using the received key identifier. If
they find that they share a common key, they will each calculate a secret pairwise secret key using Blom’s scheme. This
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secret key will be concatenated (symbolized below by ||) with the shared common key and used to encrypt a message that
contains a new nonce value associated with the responding node, an identification value used to uniquely identify the
communication link between the nodes, and a random session key Sk that will be used as the second-half of the secret key
between each node. The first half of the key will be the common key shared between both node-pairs. Assuming that Node
1 and Node 2 each share a common half-key, the following details the steps that both nodes will take in establishing a secure
communication link.
1.) Node 1 broadcast ID1||N1, where N1 is a nonce value generated by Node 1 and ID1 is equal to integer 1 and is the
identifier assigned to Node 1 and its primary key.
2.) Node 2 picks up ID1||N1, sees it has a key associated with ID1 and sends back to Node 1: ID2||N1||E12(ID12, N2, Sk),
where ID12 is a random number used as a link identifier between both nodes, N2 is a nonce value generated by Node
2, Sk is a random 32-bit session key, and E12 ( ) is a symmetric encryption function. The encryption key for E12 ( ) is
calculated as follows:
a.

Using the Vandermonde matrix in Equation 1, Node 2 calculates the matrix G column associated with
Node 1 using the primitive element s stored in Node 2 by the primary integer identifier sent from Node 1
and raising this seed element to power n for 2 < n ≤ λ.

b.

Node 2 calculates a pairwise secret key between Node 1 and Node 2 using K12 = K21 = A(2) ⋅G(1), where
A(2) is Node 2 assigned row from matrix A and G(1) is Node 1’s column data.

c.

Node 2 generates an encryption key for E12 ( ) by concatenating the shared key between both nodes and the
calculated K12 key.

3.) Node 1, having received ID2|| N1||E12 (ID12, N2, Sk) and using the integer identifier associated with Node 2, calculates
the key for E12 ( ) following steps 2a-2c. Node 1 decrypts E12 ( ) to retrieve ID12, N2, and Sk.
4.) Node 1 sends back an acknowledgement message to Node 2 of N2||Ek (ID12, N1). This completes the authentication
and key exchange between both nodes.
The authentication and key exchange listed above assumes that a shared key will be discovered between two nodes such that
the shared key is a primary key for one node and an ancillary key for the second node. In the event that nodes within
communication range cannot establish a primary to secondary key agreement, nodes will attempt to establish a secondary-tosecondary key agreement by broadcasting for each ancillary key in its key set a message containing IDX||NX||IDPrimary, where
IDX is a ancillary key identifier, NX is a nonce value associated with IDX, and IDPrimary is a nodes primary identification
number. Once two nodes determine that they share the same key-half, steps 1 – 4 will be followed with IDX||NX||IDPrimary
replacing ID1||N1 in step 1. The primary node identifier is used for all Blom matrix calculations.
Node Revocation

In the event that a sensor node is compromised, it is important to revoke that hostile node. Our scheme supports two
approaches to effect node revocation. Link revocation removes all communication links, while key revocation removes all
key(s) associated with the compromised node. Link revocation allows only selected node-pair links to be removed thereby
minimizing the impact of revocation on the network. This can be accomplished since each node-pair shares a mutually
exclusive link identifier and session key. While multiple node-pairs may share the same half-key, their other key-half will be
distinct to each node-pair. Key revocation, in comparison, removes all shared half-key(s) associated with the compromised
node, which may cause multiple links to disappear once the key(s) are removed. Both methods assume that a secure base
station is used to monitor and manage the sensor network.
Link revocation can be implemented using a network routing table generated after post-deployment of the sensor network
and link establishment between node-pairs. The base station creates a network routing table by having each node-pair
identify their associated link identifier and having this information sent over the network to a base station. Key revocation
follows the same procedure but one or more keys and not associated links are removed during the revocation process. Once
the keys have been removed from the memory space of each node, some links may disappear and will require the affected
nodes to establish new links by restarting the shared-key discovery and/or path-key establishment phases.
Several options are available to revoke the compromised node including the use of a shared signature key, which is installed
between a base station and all nodes of the sensor network during the pre-deployment phase. To initiate revocation of a link
or key(s), the base station will broadcast to all network nodes a signed revocation message containing the link identifier(s) or
key(s) to be revoked. After obtaining the signed revocation message, each node will verify the signature of the signed
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message and, if valid, will remove the link identifier(s) or key(s) from their memory. This method is simple to implement but
poses a security risk due to its reliance on a single signature key. The second option uses a signed unicast message that
contains the link identifiers(s) and associated session key(s) that need to be revoked between a base station and each affected
sensor node in the network. Each sensor node will share a unique key with the base station that can be installed during the
pre-deployment phase or computed as Kshared = EKx (ci), where Kx = K1 ⊕, … , ⊕ Kk, Ki are the keys assigned to the sensor
node, ci is the base station identifier, and EKx is an encryption function with node key Kx. Security is increase with method
two and was proposed and used by Eschenauer and Gilgor in their key management scheme.
SECURITY ANALYSIS OF OUR KEY PRE-DISTRIBUTION SCHEME

Our key pre-distribution scheme, at its fundamental level, is a hybrid between Eschenauer and Gilgor’s promulgation of
random key distribution and Blom’s generation of pairwise secret keys. Under Eschenauer and Gilgor’s scheme, a node
carries a subset of k randomly sampled keys from a larger pool of P keys that, if compromised, will allow an adversary to

k
any sensor network link. Since multiple nodes may share one or more keys,
P
k ⋅ shared number of links
compromising one node may allow an adversary to attack
links. Their analysis suggests,
p

attack successfully with probability of

“compromise of one key does lead to the compromise of another link with probability 0.3, of two other links with probability
0.1, and so on.” Under Blom’s key generation scheme, all pairwise keys can be obtained if more than λ nodes are
compromised. To improve security, λ can be increased but this requires increased memory space. Our scheme achieves
better resilience against node capture over existing key pre-distribution schemes since compromise of one node yields only k
keys out of a larger pool of P keys, which yield little value without additional compromise of more than λ nodes. One attack
potential not addressed by Blom is the compromise of one node and its associated row information of matrix A may allow an
adversary to masquerade as the captured node and to establish a secure communication link with any sensor node in the
network. Undetected, the masquerading node could initiate passive and active attacks including traffic analysis, modification
of messages, or general disruptions of communications (Schneir, 1996). Our scheme reduces the probability of this type of
an attack; compromising the kth row information of matrix A at node k is not sufficient to establish a communication link with
another sensor node. An adversary would need to compromise the captured sensor nodes random key set and find another
node in the network with a common key or key set to integrate a captured node into the network.
Regardless of the scheme, additional weaknesses are seen with the amount of memory utilization required to store k random
keys or λ + 1 finite elements from row information of matrix A. Using 250 as the benchmark for the number of keys or λ + 1
finite elements stored in each sensor node, and assuming each key and each finite element in λ + 1 is 64-bits, 2 kilobytes of
RAM would be required. While a security analysis has not been done to determine what λ-secure value is needed to equal
the same security level for a defined quantity of keys under Eschenauer and Gilgor’s scheme, it is predicted that a large λvalue would be needed to meet the same security level between both schemes. Due to the limited memory capacity
associated with sensor nodes, increasing the λ-value may not be possible.
Our proposal uses substantially less memory space. Under our scheme, each sensor node receives a randomly sampled subset
of 32-bit keys, compared to 64-bits under the Eschenauer and Gilgor scheme. Once a secure link is established, an additional
32-bits is added to create a 64-bit session key but the number of established session keys that must be stored in each node is
much smaller than storing a k set of 64-bit keys, many of which will never be used once the network field has been
established. While our scheme requires the storage of λ + 1 finite elements, it is hypothesized that a small λ-value can be
chosen to meet a comparable security threshold level.
BENEFITS SUMMARY OF OUR KEY PRE-DISTRIBUTION SCHEME

This paper posited the details of a new key pre-distribution scheme with the following properties:
1.

Authentication and key distribution in one set of protocols. Only nodes that share a common key, or use an
intermediary with a common key, will be able to establish a secure channel.

2.

Establishment of unique communication links with different key-sets that can support future network routing
establishment and study. Each communication link between each node-pair is uniquely identified and secure with a
session key composed of a first-half key common to both and a second half that is randomly generated. Key
distribution relies on a nodes ability to calculate a temporary cryptographic key from a set of linear algebra
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operations defined in Blom’s key generation scheme and is supported by the λ-secure property. The link identifiers
can be used for message routing or link revocation in the event of a compromised node-pair.
3.

Theoretically improved network resiliency and lower memory utilization over existing key pre-distribution schemes.
Our scheme achieves better resilience against node compromise over Eschenauer and Gilgor’s pre-distribution
scheme since compromise of one node yields only k keys out of a larger pool of P keys. This provides little value
without the additional compromise of more than λ nodes, as specified by Blom’s scheme and supported in our
algorithm. Lastly, each sensor node receives a randomly sampled subset of 32-bit keys, compared to 64-bits under
the Eschenauer and Gilgor scheme. Once a secure link is established, an additional 32-bits is added to create a 64bit session key but the number of established session keys that must be stored in each node is much smaller than
storing a k set of 64-bit keys, many of which will never be used once the network field has been established.

CONCLUSION

Nodes within wireless communication range will be able to establish a shared-key connectivity provided that they meet the
points listed above. While limitations of a sensor network (e.g., wireless communication range, mutually exclusive key sets,
etc.) may preclude a network with 100% shared-connectivity, it should be possible to calculate the required key size, k, pool
size, P, and λ-secure level for a sensor node with memory size, m, so that k nodes are connected. Eschenauer and Gilgor
showed using random graph theory that share-connectivity was “almost certain” for a 10,000-node network with a key ring of
250 keys drawn out of a pool of 100,000. While it is expected that the conclusions proposed by Eschenauer and Gilgor
would also hold in our proposed scheme, a detailed mathematical study is required for validation. We are presently
developing mathematical models that will analyze our algorithm and simulation models to test its performance. Additional
work is required to validate the premise that our proposed scheme provides greater resiliency to security attacks than other
schemes addressed in this paper.
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